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Abstract: External fire spread between buildings is internationally considered 
as a major concern for buildings in dense urban environments. While design 
guidelines differ between countries, the fundamental methods currently used 
for limiting the risk of fire spread between buildings are generally limited to 
specifying the minimum required separation distance for a given unprotected 
façade area, or conversely, limiting the maximum allowable unprotected façade 
area for a given separation distance. The safety level associated with the cur-
rent design guidelines is however unknown, making the implementation of in-
novative, safer and more cost-effective design solutions difficult. In order to 
assess the safety target implicitly incorporated in currently accepted design so-
lutions, a methodology is developed for evaluating the annual probability of 
reaching unacceptable radiation intensities at the opposite façade. As a case 
study, the methodology is applied to a design which is in agreement with the 
current UK requirements specified in BR 187. This case study exposes incon-
sistencies in the current design guidelines, indicating the need for developing 
explicit safety targets. 
Keywords: external fire spread, separation distance, safety target, BR 187 
1 Introduction 
Limiting the risk of external fire spread between buildings is a major concern in dense ur-
ban areas. Internationally, the main strategy applied to curb the risk of city conflagrations 
is to specify minimum separation distances between buildings as a function of the unpro-
tected façade area. Specifically for the city of London, these requirements can be dated 
back to the aftermath of the 1666 Great Fire of London (BRE 2014). More recently, BR 
187 - External Fire Spread, Building Separation and Boundary Distances has been the 
main reference for determining the required building separations in the UK, but similar 
requirements are included in for example NFPA 80A (Thomson et al. 2015). 
Due to the development of new construction materials and insulation requirements, the 
proliferation of sprinkler system installations in modern buildings and the increased ten-
dency for high-rise structures, the traditional guidelines may no longer be appropriate or 
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efficient for every situation. This has been explicitly acknowledged in the recently pub-
lished second edition of BR 187, where a number of caveats requiring fire engineering 
solutions are acknowledged (BRE 2014). 
Consistency across innovative designs and building materials can be ensured by specifying 
a target safety level for external fire spread between buildings. However, the current safety 
margin incorporated in for example BR 187 is unknown – as explicitly acknowledged in 
the document itself (BRE, 2014). 
As a step towards defining an explicit safety target for external fire spread, the safety level 
of currently accepted design solutions has to be evaluated. This paper describes a method-
ology for evaluating the annual failure probability associated with building designs and can 
be applied to evaluate the implicit safety targets incorporated in current design guidelines. 
As a case study, the methodology is applied to evaluate the failure probability associated 
with a design situation that is in agreement with BR 187. 
2 Defining “failure”: the limit criterion 
When considering external fire spread between buildings, a distinction should be made 
between ‘offensive’ fire spread where a fire in the building under consideration (i.e. the 
building being designed, building A) results in fire ignition at an opposing building (build-
ing B), and ‘defensive’ fire spread where fire in the opposite building B results in fire igni-
tion at building A. 
This distinction seems to be mostly neglected in current guidelines, but the difference can 
be important as the legal requirements and responsibilities may be different, as well as the 
engineering solutions applied to limit the risk. The legal implications are not further inves-
tigated in this paper, but it is tentatively suggested that the building owner may have some 
margin in accepting an increased defensive fire spread risk (for example by increasing the 
area of glazed non fire-rated façade) if the consequences are considered acceptable, while 
this would not immediately be the case when considering the risk of offensive fire spread. 
The physical phenomenon of fire ignition is however very difficult to characterize. As dis-
cussed in (Drysdale 1998), the initiation of flaming combustion requires a sufficient mix-
ture of oxygen and volatilized combustibles. In order for the combustion process to 
continue (or accelerate), this mixture should transfer a sufficient amount of heat to the fuel 
source for a continued volatilization of combustibles at a sufficiently high rate. Conse-
quently, ignition of a solid material depends not only on the material characteristics and 
surface temperature, but also on the heating and cooling conditions. 
BR 187 conservatively defines a risk of fire ignition to exist when the radiation intensity at 
a given location exceeds 12.56 kW/m2 (BRE 2014). This value corresponds with the radia-
tion intensity at which dried wood has been found to ignite in the presence of a pilot flame. 
The same value (12.5 kW/m2) is used in NFPA 80A (Thomson et al. 2015). In general, the 
value of 12.56 kW/m2 is considered as a lower bound for fire spread to the opposite build-
ing to occur, since most materials would require higher radiation intensities under the same 
test  conditions.  However,  Hare  and  Burrel  (2006)  state  that  a  value  as  low as  10  kW/m2 
may be more appropriate for plastic building materials, as acknowledged in (BRE, 2014). 
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It would be most interesting to incorporate an evaluation of fire ignition criteria in a proba-
bilistic framework; however, for the purpose of this study and considering the wide-spread 
acceptance of the 12.56 kW/m2 limit for the incident radiation intensity, the offensive and 
defensive failure probabilities Pf,O and Pf,D are defined through equations (1) and (2), with I 
being the received radiation intensity, and the index AB indicating radiation emitted from 
A to B, and vice versa for the index BA. In order to consider a meaningful timeframe for 
the evaluation of (1) and (2), a single year is considered (annual exceedance probability). 
௙ܲ,ை = ܲ ቂܫ஺஻ > 12.56ܹ݇ ݉ଶൗ ቃ (1) 
௙ܲ,஽ = ܲ ቂܫ஻஺ > 12.56ܹ݇ ݉ଶൗ ቃ (2) 
 
As in (Van Coile et al. 2015) the point with the highest exceedance probability on the fa-
çade is considered to define the overall façade performance. This is a logical definition 
since radiation intensities received at different locations along the opposite façade are high-
ly correlated, or even perfectly correlated, in the framework of BR 187. Therefore, equa-
tions (1) and (2) should be evaluated by taking the maximum values across the façade. 
3 Calculation methodology 
The failure probabilities defined by equations (1) and (2) indicate the annual probability of 
exceeding the limit criterion for incident radiation I (also called irradiation). Naturally, the 
risk of fire spread from building A to building B and exceedance of the irradiation limit at 
B’s façade can only occur when a fire initiates in building A. Furthermore, if the fire is 
immediately extinguished by the occupants of A or quickly suppressed by the attending 
Fire and Rescue Service, no risk of external fire spread exists. Similarly, a successful fire 
control or suppression by sprinklers (when present) will prevent the temperature in the fire 
compartment from reaching levels which may result in external fire spread (BRE, 2014). In 
conclusion, unacceptable radiation levels are only possible (within reason) for post-
flashover fires. Note that for large floor plates, the term post-flashover fire as used above is 
applied as well to a fire fully engulfing a significant portion of the total floor plate. 
The above discussion is represented by a fault tree analysis in Figure 1. This analysis is 
similar to the fault-tree given in BS 7974-7:2003 (BSI, 2003) and visualizes the path up to 
a fully developed fire. Given the occurrence of a fully developed fire in A, the (condition-
al) probability of exceedance the irradiation limit at the façade of building B is defined as 
Pf,fi,AB. 
Considering the fault tree of Figure 1, the failure probability Pf,O of equation (1) is given 
by equation (3), with pig the annual probability of fire ignition in building A, pf,u the proba-
bility that the occupants (users) fail to suppress the fire, pf,fb the  probability  that  the  Fire  
and Rescue Service (fire brigade) fails to suppress the fire, and pf,s the probability that 
sprinklers fail to control or suppress the fire (pf,s = 1 if no sprinklers are installed). The con-
tributions of occupants, Fire and Rescue Service, sprinklers (and any other possible 
measures not considered here) are combined into psup, i.e. the probability of successful ear-
ly fire control or suppression (with early control or suppression defined as the avoidance of 
flashover). 
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Figure 1: Fault tree indicating uncertain events resulting into  
 
௙ܲ,ை = ݌௜௚ ή ݌௙,௨ ή ݌௙,௙௕ ή ݌௙,௦ ή ௙ܲ,௙௜,஺஻ = ݌௜௚ ή ൫1 െ ݌௦௨௣൯ ή ௙ܲ,௙௜,஺஻  (3) 
Note that when building A has multiple fire compartments, the probability Pf,fi,AB will be 
different for each compartment. In the general case, also pig and psup can be considered 
dependent on the specific compartment. In order not to introduce unnecessary complexity, 
the derivations in this paragraph consider a single fire compartment for building A. 
Probabilities of fire ignition pig are given in PD 7974-7:2003 (BSI, 2003). While these val-
ues apply specifically to the UK, data for other countries can be found in literature, see for 
example (Fontana et al. 1999) for Switzerland and (Rahikainen and Keski-Rahkonen 2004) 
for Finland. Early fire suppression failure probabilities are specified in Handbook 5 of the 
Eurocodes (Holicky et al. 2005) and have been applied by (Albrecht and Hosser 2010). PD 
7974-7 indicates a sprinkler failure probability of 5%. This effectiveness of sprinklers in 
preventing flashover is illustrated by the damage area statistics given in Annex A of PD 
7974-7. 
Considering the above, only the probability Pf,fi,AB of exceeding the irradiation limit given 
the occurrence of a fire in building A remains unknown. All other variables can be readily 
found in national and international guidance documents. 
A methodology for calculating the conditional failure probability Pf,fi,AB has been presented 
in (Van Coile et al. 2015). The methodology uses Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate 
equation (4), where IAB,fi is the irradiation at B given a fire in building A as defined by 
equation (5). In (5), ĳ is the viewfactor, İ is the emissivity of the fire compartment (consid-
ering the model assumptions of BR 187), ı is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, and T is the 
temperature of the fire compartment in Kelvin. 
௙ܲ,௙௜,஺஻ = ܲ ቂܫ஺஻,௙௜ > 12.56 ܹ݇ ݉ଶൗ ቃ (4) 
ܫ஺஻,௙௜ = ߮ߝߪܶସ (5) 
 
The Stefan-Boltzmann constant is a clearly defined physics constant and the view factor ĳ 
is a geometric property fully defined by the layout of the two opposing facades and both 
are consequently deterministic. As part of the methodology the maximum viewfactor for 
any point of the opposite (“cold”) façade should be considered. The emissivity İ is less 
clearly defined. Whereas the concepts underlying BR 187 consider İ =  1  (the  physical  
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maximum), a value in the range 0.7 to 1.0 can be considered more realistic. Heated bricks 
for example emit radiation with an emissivity of approximately 0.75 (Drysdale, 2009), 
while for concrete an emissivity of 0.7 is considered in EN 1992-1-2 (CEN, 2004). For the 
case study discussed further İ is modelled by a uniform distribution in the range 0.7 to 1.0. 
The compartment temperature T is dependent on the fire load density q, the opening factor 
O and the thermal absorptivity of the compartment enclosure b. For a given design b can 
reasonably be considered deterministic and b = 1700 J/m2s0.5K will be considered further 
(being a reasonable value for concrete). The fire load density q on the other hand is highly 
uncertain, with British Standards specifying a stepwise cumulative density function in 
function of the building use, as applied in (Van Coile, 2015). Alternatively, mean fire load 
densities are given in EN 1991-1-2 (CEN, 2002a) and reference is made to a Gumbel dis-
tribution with a coefficient of variation 0.3. In the case study given in the next section the 
British stepwise distribution is used. 
Finally, the opening factor is dependent on the uncertain breakage of windows during fire. 
In (Van Coile, 2015) the uncertain window breakage is modelled through a uniform distri-
bution for the (physically possible) area of broken windows and a uniform distribution for 
the associated (physically possible) average height of the broken areas. For a given (sto-
chastic realization of) window breakage, the opening factor O is analytically defined 
through the definition given in EN 1991-1-2. 
Considering the failure criterion incorporated in (4), and considering Monte Carlo simula-
tions and the stochastic variables discussed above, an evaluation of Pf,fi,AB can be made. 
While the above discussions focussed on the offensive failure probability Pf,O, the defen-
sive failure probability Pf,D can be readily calculated by applying the same methodology 
starting from building B and evaluating the irradiation exceedance rate at the façade of 
building A. If multiple buildings Bi are in the vicinity of building A, the methodology has 
to be applied for each of these buildings and the exceedance probabilities have to be com-
bined to determine the overall Pf,D. 
4 Evaluating the safety level of currently accepted design 
solutions: case study UK guidance BR 187 
4.1 Case study introduction and standard application of BR 187 
The methodology described above is applied to evaluate the safety target for exceeding 
unacceptable radiation levels as implicitly incorporated in BR 187 (BRE, 2014). Note that 
the case-study described further is only a specific example and that many more evaluations 
are required before a definitive conclusion can be made with respect to the implicit safety 
targets underlying BR 187. 
Consider the façade locations as indicated in Figure 2. Building A is a 15 m high, 12 m 
wide and 20 m deep office building where every floor is a separate fire compartment with a 
height of 3 m. The separation in different fire compartments has the advantage of flexibil-
ity with respect to the possibility of multiple tenants occupying different floors or a future 
change in use. The opposite building B is also an office building, but with a height of 21 
m, a width of 40 m and 20 m depth.  Building B has been designed as a single fire com-
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partment in accordance with BS 9999:2008 (BSI, 2008). Both buildings have a fully glazed 
façade and have been positioned as close to the “notional boundary” as allowed by BR 187 
(applying the Enclosing Rectangle method) in order to maximize the available floor area. 
Furthermore, the centres of both façades (floor plan) are perfectly opposite each other.  
The Enclosing Rectangle method is effectively tabulated data of acceptable design solu-
tions. By determining the smallest rectangular shape enclosing the unprotected areas in the 
façade, a table applies which specifies values for the minimum distance to the notional 
boundary in function of the height and width of this enclosing rectangle and the area per-
centage of the rectangle which is constituted by the unprotected areas. When applying the 
Enclosing Rectangle method, the resultant design can be considered to be in accordance 
with BR 187. 
The Enclosing Rectangle specifies minimum distance to the “notional boundary”. This 
notional  boundary  as  used  in  the  application  of  BR  187  generally  refers  to  the  site-
boundary, but can also extend to the middle of a public road in between both buildings. 
The distinction is of no importance for the discussion further, although changing the defini-
tion of the “notional boundary” in the future may allow to alleviate the inconsistencies de-
scribed further. 
 
Figure 2: Case study building location and geometry 
As every floor in building A is a separate compartment (with a height of 3 m), the Enclos-
ing Rectangle with height 3 m and width 12 m applies. For a 100% unprotected façade BR 
187 indicates a minimum distance dA of 4 m to the notional boundary. Building B has not 
been subdivided in different fire compartments, and thus the applicable Enclosing Rectan-
gle has a height of 21 m and a width of 40 m. For a 100% unprotected façade a minimum 
boundary distance dB of 19 m is prescribed by BR 187. Consequently, the total building 
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separation distance dsep = 23 m. These values refer to the ‘low fire load’ category of BR 
187 since both buildings have been classified as office buildings.  
The minimum distances to the notional boundary are supposed to limit the risk of exceed-
ing the irradiation limit in case of fire, but are based on a “mirror-concept” where the op-
posing building is (implicitly) assumed to be identical to the building being designed – as 
explicitly acknowledged in the background information for BR 187 (BRE, 2014). In other 
words: if a minimum separation distance of 8 m would be required to an opposing “mirror 
building”, BR 187 would prescribe a minimum distance of 4 m to the notional boundary – 
as is the case for building A. However, as dA and dB are different, there may be a mismatch 
between the offensive / defensive failure probabilities of both buildings. 
4.2 Calculation of the conditional probabilities Pf,fi,AB and Pf,fi,BA 
Applying the methodology described above, Pf,fi,BA equals 0.18, while Pf,fi,AB is smaller than 
10-6. Note that the offensive failure probability for building A equals the defensive failure 
probability for building B, and vice versa (considering a single compartment of building 
A).  
In the above, the probability Pf,fi,BA refers to the point of the building A façade opposite the 
centre of building B (i.e. at X = 0 m, Y = 20 m, and at a height of 10.5 m, see Figure 2). 
The failure probability Pf,fi,AB relates to the façade of building B located opposite the centre 
of building A (i.e.  the point at  a location X = 23 m and Y = 20 m), at  mid-height of the 
specific compartment (floor) of building A where the fully developed fire occurs. As every 
floor is identical, the same maximum failure probability relates to different heights along 
the façade of building B dependent on the fire location in building A. Façade areas further 
away from this central point have a lower failure probability as they have a smaller view-
factor with respect to the compartment of building A, as illustrated by Figure 3 where the 
viewfactor along the façade of building B is illustrated at mid-height of a fire compartment 
in building A for different separation distances dsep. 
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Figure 3: Viewfactor along the facade of building B at mid-height of the fire compartment in building 
A, for different separation distances dsep 
 
The results for Pf,fi,AB and Pf,fi,BA indicate a mismatch between failure probabilities for both 
buildings. However, for the single compartment of building B a fire temperature calcula-
tion considering travelling fires could be more appropriate and may reduce Pf,fi,BA. Note 
that the single compartment of building B falls outside the principal applicability range of 
the Eurocode parametric fire curve, but opting to maintain this fire curve allows the results 
to be in agreement with the background documentation included in BR 187.   
Note: Pf,fi,AB has been specified above as being smaller than 10-6. This result is based on 108 
Monte Carlo simulations. This number of simulations would result in a coefficient of varia-
tion for a Pf  = 10-6 of approximately 0.1. The fact that not a single failure was observed in 
the entire set of Monte Carlo simulations therefore corresponds with an astronomically 
small probability that Pf,fi,AB would nevertheless be larger than 10-6. It is suggested that 
there are physical limits to irradiation intensities which can be achieved at a given distance 
of a fire. When considering for example an emissivity İ of 1 and a (maximum) viewfactor 
ĳAB of approximately 0.02 (see dsep = 23m in Figure 3), equation (5) results in a compart-
ment temperature of 1530°C. It may be physically impossible to reach this temperature for 
the considered compartment geometry. This argument is not further evaluated in this paper.  
4.3 Annual failure probabilities associated with the BR 187 design 
The probabilities Pf,fi,AB and Pf,fi,BA are conditional on the occurrence of a fully developed 
fire. The associated annual failure probabilities are calculated through equation (3), con-
sidering the fire ignition frequencies and suppression success rates given in Table 1, where 
A is the total building floor area. 
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Table 1: Fire ignition frequencies and suppression failure probabilities, based on (Albrecht 
and Hosser, 2010) and PD 7974-7:2003 (BSI, 2003) 
Parameter Building A Building B 
pig = aA 




0.0144 / year 




0.0672 / year 





Considering 5 fire compartments in building A, each with a floor plate of approximately 
240 m2, the frequency of fully developed fires in building A is estimated at 0.00144 and 
the annual probability Pf,AB of exceeding the irradiation limit at building B because of a fire 
in building A is thus considered to be smaller than 1.5·10-9. This exceedance probability is 
many orders of magnitude smaller than commonly accepted failure probabilities in design. 
When considering for example the design of new structures in accordance with EN 1990 
(CEN, 2002b), the target failure probability for the strength criterion of structural elements 
is 7.23·10-5. 
Applying the same considerations to building B results in an annual exceedance probability 
Pf,BA of 0.0012. 
Many improvements can be made to the calculations, however, the annual exceedance 
probabilities calculated above are considered to give a reasonable estimation of the order 
of magnitude (and variability) of the actual annual exceedance probabilities associated 
with the BR 187 design concept. 
When sprinklers are installed in the building, the annual exceedance probabilities will drop 
accordingly. Similarly, an improved fire suppression success rate of the occupants or Fire 
and Rescue Service would reduce the calculated failure probabilities, as would other man-
agement procedures directly influencing the fire ignition frequency. In order to allow for a 
fast comparison of different design situations, Figure 4 visualizes the calculated probabili-
ties Pf,AB and Pf,BA as a function of the annual frequency of a fully developed fire Ȝ, together 
with curves for other (hypothetical) conditional exceedance probabilities Pf,fi. Referring to 
equation (3), Ȝ is calculated as pig·(1-psup). 
When installing for example sprinklers in building B with a success rate of 0.95 in accord-
ance with BR 187, Ȝ = 0.00034 per year, resulting in Pf,BA = 5.96·10-5 / year from Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Annual exceedance probability of the irradiation criterion as a function of the annual proba-
bility of a fully developed fire, for different conditional probabilities Pf,fi 
4.4 Parameter study: influence of the separation distance 
The failure probability mismatch for the case study of Figure 2 can be more generally 
evaluated by considering different separation distances dsep. Results are visualized in Fig-
ure 5 (linear scale) and Figure 6 (logarithmic scale). The asymptote in Figure 6 at approx-
imately 16.2 m seems to confirm the hypothesis made earlier that there is a physical limit 
to the possibility of exceeding the irradiation limit. 
Pf,fi,AB is larger than Pf,fi,BA for small separation distances due to the different fire tempera-
ture predicted by the Eurocode parametric fire curve as a function of the compartment size 
and ventilation conditions. For Pf,fi,BA a larger fraction of fires has a fire temperature which 
does not result in exceedance of the irradiation limit (for a given separation distance). For a 
separation distance of approximately 4.45 m, Pf,fi,AB = Pf,fi,BA. While this means that a 
boundary distance of 2.2 m for both buildings would result in a very equitable design solu-
tion (as both designs would have the same “burdens” and “benefits”), the associated condi-
tional exceedance probability may potentially be considered too high. 
By combining the conditional probabilities calculated here with the interpolation graph of 
Figure 4, an immediate evaluation of the corresponding annual exceedance probabilities 
can be made. 
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Figure 5: Conditional exceedance probabilities Pf,fi,AB and Pf,fi,BA for  the  case  study  of  Figure  2,  but  
considering alternative values for the separation distance dsep (linear scale) 
 
Figure 6: Conditional exceedance probabilities Pf,fi,AB and Pf,fi,BA for  the  case  study  of  Figure  2,  but  
considering alternative values for the separation distance dsep (logarithmic scale) 
5 Conclusions 
External fire spread between buildings is a major concern in dense urban environments. In 
order to facilitate the safe implementation of innovative technical and/or architectural de-
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signs and alternative more cost-effective solutions, the application of a safety target for 
external fire spread would be beneficial. As a first step towards deriving explicit safety 
targets, a methodology is presented which allows to evaluate the safety level corresponding 
with currently accepted design solutions. The application of the proposed methodology to 
evaluate the safety level achieved by the commonly used UK guidelines of BR 187 indi-
cates a very significant difference in failure probabilities between designs. The most oner-
ous design calculated has an offensive failure probability – i.e. fire ignition at the opposite 
façade – below 1.5·10-9 per year, while the same building has a defensive failure probabil-
ity – i.e. irradiation exceedance at the building facade due to fire in the opposite building – 
of 0.0012 per year (for the specific case study considered). While further evaluations are 
required to fully map the range of safety levels achieved by the BR 187 methods, the re-
sults presented in this paper seem to support the case for the application of quantitative 
risk-based approaches to design aspects related to external fire spread between buildings. 
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